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entrepreneur’s optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non-
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1 Introduction
The importance of the provision of high quality public services such as health, education, child
care and care for the aged cannot be overstated.1 Clearly, voters and consequently their elected
representatives place a high value on these, and improvements in these areas are given high priority
in the social agenda of any modern society. However, several potential pathologies associated with
the provision of such services have been recognized in the economics literature. In particular, one
kind of market failure that has received considerable attention is the one induced by the high
degree of information asymmetries between providers and consumers over the quality of these
services. The problem arises when consumers are not as well informed about the quality of the
service or when the quality of the service is difficult to measure and verify by third parties. In
such circumstances, it is argued, service providers have an incentive to act opportunistically and
take advantage of the ill-informed consumer. These informational problems are exacerbated by the
fact that often the person who is consuming these services is not the person who is choosing them.
For example, a parent chooses and pays for her child’s schooling but is not the recipient of the
services; moreover, the quality of the provided service may be hard to assess immediately because
the potential deficiencies may manifest themselves only as the child grows up.2
In response to these informational problems, which following the literature we will refer to as
“contractual failures”, it has been suggested by some authors, starting with Hansmann (1980),3 that
nonprofit organizations are an effective solution because the low-powered incentives that permeate
the structure of these organizations provide insurance to the consumer that she is not going to
be exploited. In other words, what this theory argues is that nonprofit organizations act as a
commitment mechanism for the provision of quality services in circumstances where quality is too
costly to monitor.
Interestingly, Hart et al. (1997) use a similar rationale in an influential paper that analyzes the
choice between in-house government provision of services and contracting out to private suppliers,
when the quality of service the government requires cannot be fully specified. The conclusion
that emerges from their analysis is that private provision is generally more cost efficient but may
1These services are often more accurately characterized as quasi-public goods in that they yield both public and
private benefits. In addition, the mere fact that the private sector is partly involved in the provision of these services
indicates that they fail to satisfy (or do not satisfy fully) one or both of the principal properties associated with pure
public goods: non-rivalry and non-excludability.
2This type of goods, which are evaluated by experience, are commonly referred to as experience goods (see Nelson
1970).
3Other early studies of nonprofit organizations that emphasize the role of asymmetric information between pro-
ducers and consumers are Easly and O’Hara (1983) and Weisbrod (1988).
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result in lower quality service because private suppliers have a stronger incentive to undertake cost
reduction that adversely affects quality. In a recent formalization of the “contractual failure” idea,
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) apply the incomplete contracts framework of Hart et al. to study the
choice of an entrepreneur between setting up a for-profit firm and a nonprofit organization. The
prediction of their model is that when the benefit of commitment is high, that is, when consumers
value quality highly and are willing to pay higher prices anticipating better quality, then nonprofit
status is preferable, despite the fact that the entrepreneur is not the full claimant of profits, because
it ensures softer incentives to skimp on quality.
This paper is motivated by the fact that in spite of its intuitive appeal, the contractual failure
approach seems to have overlooked a potentially important issue, namely, that the relationship
between purchaser and supplier is, in many cases, an on-going one. The on-going aspect of the
relationship should allow reputation to emerge as another mechanism for maintaining high unveri-
fiable quality.4 Therefore, a potential limitation of the contractual failure argument is that it fails
to take into account the interaction between reputations and the choice of organizational form or
treats the two as orthogonal.
However, markets that involve unverifiable quality are exactly the ones where we would expect
long-term relationships to predominate and reputation effects to matter. Specifically, the repeated
feature of the interaction between producer and consumer seems particularly relevant in the case
of public services, where the arrangement of services is typically of a continuing nature and rarely
entails a one-time exchange. A related shortcoming of this theory arises when one considers a salient
pattern in the sectoral concentration of nonprofits. In particular, contractual failures cannot be
reconciled with the observation that nonprofit organizations tend to engage predominantly in the
provision of health, education, social and other mission-oriented services and not other services
where quality is equally unobservable and informational problems are acute (for example business,
professional, legal services, etc.), yet, only for-profit firms appear to have established themselves
as quality providers of services in the latter. Thus, two related questions can be raised: (a) Is it
possible for reputation mechanisms to work equally well in the provision of public services and ensure
the supply of quality services by for-profit firms? (b)What factors determine when reputation is a
sufficient consumer protection mechanism and when not, in which case nonprofit status is necessary
to resolve failures associated with informational imperfections?
The purpose of this paper is to address explicitly these questions by studying the optimal
4Word of mouth is also a means of learning about the quality of the services of various providers. Therefore,
reputation is valuable not only because of the multiple purchases by the same person, but also through the impact
of this person’s experience on his friends and family.
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choice of organizational status allowing reputation to act as an alternative commitment mechanism
to nonprofit status for the provision of high quality services.5 Our analysis builds on the Glaeser
and Shleifer (2001) model because it captures the essence of the theory in a concise and formal way.
A repeated game is the natural environment to study reputation effects. Therefore, we extend the
one-shot framework to a setting of repeated interaction between the consumer and the provider
of the service and establish conditions under which reputation is a sufficient mechanism for the
provision of quality services by for-profit firms. The idea that repeated purchases are a means
of disciplining the producer to deliver high quality has been previously explored in the Industrial
Organization literature.6 The difference in our approach is that, besides quality, the choice of
organizational form is endogenous and the interest is on what combination of type of firm and
quality level will be optimally chosen in a dynamic set-up.
One may question whether adopting an infinite horizon framework is appropriate for our pur-
poses, as some of the interactions between consumers and service providers in industries where
nonprofits are present have a fixed and finite end.7 For instance, parents are interested in seeking
child care services for a specific and known beforehand amount of time: until the child goes to
school. Nevertheless, such examples can still be captured in an infinitely horizon setting if con-
ceived as repeated games between a single long-lived firm that is facing a sequence of once-off or
finite trades with a community of consumers who communicate with each other their experience
with the firm and condition their behavior on the firm’s behavior towards their predecessors. That
is, in order for there to be an equilibrium of the repeated game where the firm produces high
quality, only the player who is tempted to cheat (i.e. the firm providing child care services) need be
infinitely-lived or strategically behave as he were so. Moreover, the literature on finitely repeated
games has shown that under rather weak conditions, repeated games with a large but finite horizon
behave similarly to infinitely repeated games (Benoit and Krishna 1985). That is, the intuitive
argument that drives the folk theorems in infinitely repeated games can apply, with modification,
to a large class of finitely repeated games, so the results presented here could be replicated with
finite repetition in an appropriately modified version of the game.
The main finding of this paper is that when reputations can be established, that is, when
the entrepreneur is sufficiently patient, then for-profit status is the optimal choice of organization
form, and firms have an incentive to supply high quality services. In addition, it will be shown
5Licensing is an alternative means of controlling the quality of the service that is arguably imperfect because it
sets only a minimum standard on the inputs used to provide the service and does not directly affect quality. For
details on the impact of occupational licensing and certification on consumer welfare, see Shapiro (1986).
6See, for example, Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Shapiro (1983), Tirole (1988) and, more recently, Horner (2002).
7I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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that there is an intermediate range for the discount factor of the entrepreneur where reputation
for quality among those consumers valuing quality highly can be sustained only under nonprofit
incorporation, as for such consumers the range of parameters under which high quality can be
sustained in equilibrium is greater when the entrepreneur chooses nonprofit status. The intuition
for these results follows a standard folk-theorem type of argument applied to the present setting:
the loss of reputation associated with delivering bad quality service implies a substantial loss of
future profits for the firm, and therefore when the entrepreneur is sufficiently forward-looking, then
the fear of foregoing future profits disciplines him to deliver high quality services. The reason
that for-profit status is preferable when the reputation mechanism works is that with repeated
interaction, the for-profit firm can anticipate the future price reduction that will occur if it does
not offer high quality and adjusts the optimal quality offered upwards relative to what it would offer
in a one-off interaction. When this promise is credible, the consumer is willing to pay a higher price
up-front and, therefore, removes the only advantage that nonprofit commitment conveyed to the
entrepreneur in the one-shot game: the ability to charge a higher price. This suggests that in the
context of the model, resorting to a reputation mechanism when this is feasible but maintaining
a for-profit status is a less costly way for the entrepreneur to deliver high quality services than
making the commitment to forego residual claims in profits.
We believe that without dismissing the contractual failure hypothesis, the repeated-interaction
version of the model suggests that its explanatory power is perhaps more limited than previously
thought. Furthermore, we argue in section five that the model can be useful in explaining some
empirical evidence from the U.S. and Canada on the quality differences between commercial and
nonprofit child care centres. Finally, we believe the paper has some normative implications, in
particular, on the debate over the soundness of policies that favour nonprofit organizations on the
grounds that commercial firms cannot be trusted to deliver high quality service because of their
interest to earn profits. There may be a number of good reasons8 why governments should subsidize
nonprofits, but our analysis suggests that, in many sectors, overcoming contractual failures may
not be one of them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets-up the basic one-period
model of Glaeser and Shleifer, and section three extends it to a multi-period setting. The fourth
section analyzes the optimal choice of firm status in the repeated game. Section five discusses the
8Among the social benefits of nonprofit provision of public services, one can single out the positive externalities
associated with the acquisition of services such as education and childcare. Another important reason that a govern-
ment may want to subsidize nonprofits is that they offer supplemental services to the ones that are publicly provided,
which are tailored to the needs of consumers who are not satisfied with the quality of service that the government
offers.
5
Page 7 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
predictions of the model and attempts to relate them to empirical evidence on the quality of child
care centres across commercial and nonprofit providers in the U.S. and Canada. Finally, section
six offers some concluding remarks.
2 The One-Shot Game
In order to set a benchmark as well as establish some notation we introduce here the basic setup
of the one-period Glaeser-Shleifer model. The model analyzes the optimal choice of organization
from the perspective of a rational entrepreneur who contemplates entering an industry and decides
on firm type in order to maximize utility.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the entrepreneur sells one unit of the good to a
competitive market of consumers at price P , which is paid up-front. Consumers are willing to pay
Pe = z − m(q̂ − qe) for one unit of the good of expected unverifiable quality qe, where (qe = qf
if the firm is for-profit and qe = qn if nonprofit), m is a parameter capturing the consumer’s
taste for unverifiable quality, and z, q̂ are constants. Then, the entrepreneur chooses what level of
unverifiable quality q to produce and delivers it. The total cost of producing one unit of quality q is
c(q), where c(.) satisfies the standard regularity conditions: it is twice differentiable with c′(q) > 0,
c′′(q) > 0, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′(∞) =∞. The key assumption is that while q may be observable
by the consumer, the final quality of the good cannot be verified by a third party, and therefore
the transaction is subject to contractual incompleteness.
Before any transactions take place, the entrepreneur decides whether to organize the firm as
for-profit or nonprofit, denoted by f and n respectively, in order to maximize utility. Specifically,
entrepreneurs maximize a quasilinear utility function: Ui = I − b(q̂ − qi), i ∈ {f, n} where I
is income, and b is a parameter measuring entrepreneurs’ altruistic preferences or intrinsic care
for quality, which is independent of the firm’s legal status. When the entrepreneur is for-profit,
then income is equal to the profits the firm makes, while when he is nonprofit, he is subject to a
nondistribution constraint, but a fraction δ, δ < 1, of the profits can accrue to him in the form of
benefits such as fewer work hours, better working conditions, and so on.
Entrepreneurs maximize utility by choosing quality (qi), while the price Pi is predetermined by
consumer’s expectation of quality. Thus, if they choose for-profit status their objective is
(1) max
qf
Uf = Pf − c(qf )− b(q̂ − qf ),
6
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while if they choose nonprofit status
(2) max
qn
Un = δ (Pn − c(qn))− b(q̂ − qn)
with δ < 1. The optimal quality level of a for-profit entrepreneur is given by c′(qsf ) = b, while a
nonprofit entrepreneur chooses c′(qsn) =
b
δ . As an immediate consequence of the convexity of c(.),
it follows that qsn > q
s
f , a nonprofit entrepreneur commits to higher quality.
Hence, the entrepreneur chooses nonprofit status if Un > Uf , or
(3) δ (z −m(q̂ − qsn)− c(q
s
n))− b(q̂ − q
s
n) > z −m(q̂ − q
s
f )− c(q
s
f )− b(q̂ − q
s
f ).
This inequality implies that there exists a cut-off level of consumer taste for non-contractible quality
m∗, with
(4) m∗ =
(1− δ)z − (c(qsf )− δc(q
s
n))− b(q
s
n − q
s
f )
(1− δ)q̂ − qsf + δq
s
n
,
below which all entrepreneurs choose for-profit status and above which they all choose nonprofit
status.9 Thus, the one-shot analysis of the game predicts that markets for services where unver-
ifiable quality is not valued by consumers will be dominated by for-profit firms, while nonprofit
firms will provide services whose unverifiable quality is important for consumers.10 In what follows
we extend the static model to a multi-period setting where consumers and entrepreneurs interact
repeatedly.
9Note that for m >
−
m =
δ(z−c(qs
n
))−b(bq−qs
n
)
δ(bq−qs
n
)
, it is Un = 0, so the range of m over which nonprofit status is preferable
is bounded by
−
m. To rule out the degenerate case where nonprofit status is never optimal, we assume throughout
that m∗ <
−
m.
10Note that this prediction hinges on the assumption that consumers know whether the firm they are patronizing
is for-profit or not-for-profit. If in fact consumers are unaware of the firm’s type, they cannot form their expectations
about quality based on it and, hence, trying to explain the emergence of nonprofit institutions as a response to
contractual failures would be problematic.
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3 The Repeated Game
Now suppose that there is infinitely repeated interaction between the consumer and the entrepreneur.11
In the dynamic game, the consumer bases her purchasing decision on the firm’s past behavior, that
is, based on the firm’s “reputation”. If the firm has built a reputation for producing high quality,
then the consumer will be willing to pay the associated price as long as the entrepreneur’s past
actions live up to his reputation. Thus, the entrepreneur can choose quality to maximize one-period
utility, internalizing the adverse effect that his choice of quality has on the price that the consumer
is willing to pay, namely, he can choose first-best quality. However, the entrepreneur’s promise of
high quality is credible provided it is incentive compatible for him to commit to providing better
quality. That is, the entrepreneur will choose to build and maintain a reputation for high quality
if this strategy generates a discounted stream of payoffs that exceed the one-shot gains of cheating
and being punished in future transactions. As might be expected, if entrepreneurs are sufficiently
patient, then the first-best outcome can be achieved under any ownership.12 In what follows we
focus on (a) establishing and comparing the level of incentive compatible per-period payoffs that
can be supported using punishment strategies that entail reversion to the outcome of the one-shot
game under the two alternative organizational forms, and (b) on examining the possible configu-
rations of firm status (for-profit, nonprofit) and quality (one-shot, reputation) that can occur in
the infinite repetition of the stage game for the different values of the discount factor β and the
consumer taste for quality parameter m.
3.1 For Profit Status
In each period the structure of the interaction is as follows. The entrepreneur chooses organizational
form, and the consumer pays up-front for the service. Then the entrepreneur makes his quality
choice and delivers the service. The consumer observes the quality chosen by the entrepreneur and
forms her beliefs about future quality. If the producer deviates from delivering promised quality
he is punished in future interactions by the consumer agreeing to pay up-front only for one-shot
quality. Notice that for this punishment to be possible, consumers ought to have a good idea
about the quality chosen by the entrepreneur. This learning can be facilitated if consumers share
11The assumption that the firm is infinitely lived is important here. Behaviour that would be compatible with
(ICF ) cannot arise if there is a final period to the firm’s life because the unique subgame Nash equilibrium of that
game would be for the firm to cheat. Thus, backward induction rules out behaviour that satisfies (ICF ) in a finitely
repeated version of the game. In other words, (ICF ) can only be satisfied if at any period t, there is a positive
probability that the game will continue into period t+ 1.
12Note that as is typical in repeated games, this equilibrium is not unique. Here we focus on the one that maximizes
the entrepreneur’s payoff as being efficient and therefore plausibly focal.
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information, in which case punishment is meted out by future consumers. That is, the prospect of
word of mouth information flows between consumers and the reactions that these may cause can
also deter a firm from supplying a service of low quality. In the case of a chain of establishments,
the reputation mechanism need not apply to a specific branch, but to the public image that the
chain has developed for providing quality services. Also, information about quality can also be
transmitted through other channels; for instance, it is not uncommon for providers to be required
to publish record cards on their performance in sectors such as health care and education.
As a first step we must now determine the first-best level of quality and the resulting utility that
can be sustained in the repeated game. Formally, each period the for-profit entrepreneur maximizes
the following objective:
(5) max
qf
Uf (qf ) = z −m(q̂ − qf )− c(qf )− b(q̂ − qf ).
Therefore, the utility maximizing choice of quality q∗f (m), satisfies
(6) c′(q∗f (m)) = b+m⇒ q
∗
f (m) = c
′ −1(b+m)13
and
dq∗
f
(m)
dm =
1
c′′(q∗
f
(m)) > 0. Moreover, per-period utility in this case is given by
(7) Uf (q
∗
f (m)) = z −m(q̂ − q
∗
f (m))− c(q
∗
f (m))− b(q̂ − q
∗
f (m)).
Note that the convexity of c(.) implies hat q∗f (m) > q
s
f ; that is, the entrepreneur has an incentive
to increase the quality of the good relative to what he offers in the one-shot game (indeed, q∗f(m)
maximizes total surplus) since he can extract all the surplus that is generated.
However, the first-best choice of quality
(
q∗f (m)
)
will be supported in equilibrium if and only
if the discounted stream utility from adhering to honest behavior exceeds the payoff stream from
the deviating path. That is, incentive compatibility for the for-profit entrepreneur writes as
(8)
 11−βUf (q∗f (m)) ≥ U cf (m) +
β
1−β U
s
f (m) if 0 < m ≤ m
∗
1
1−βUf (q
∗
f (m)) ≥ U
c
f (m) +
β
1−β U
s
n(m) if m
∗ < m ≤ m
(ICF )
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and U cf (m) = z−m(q̂−q
∗
f(m))−c(q
s
f )−b(q̂−q
s
f) is the utility
the entrepreneur can attain if he deviates from offering the anticipated first-best level of quality
and instead chooses the most profitable deviation, the one-shot utility maximizing choice of quality
13c′−1(.) is continuous and strictly increasing as a consequence of the continuity of c′(.) and that it is strictly
increasing.
9
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qsf (i.e. q
s
f satisfies c
′(qsf ) = b). Moreover, when the entrepreneur deviates he loses reputation, so
in subsequent periods the consumer punishes him by reverting to the Nash equilibrium of the stage
game. Given the strategy adopted by consumers, the entrepreneur’s best-response after a deviation
in which he cheated by providing one-shot level of quality is to continue providing low quality from
then on. In particular, form higher than the cut-off levelm∗, the entrepreneur chooses to come back
as a nonprofit firm and make one-shot level of utility: U sn(m) = δ (z −m(q̂ − q
s
n)− c(q
s
n))−b(q̂−q
s
n)
every period thereafter. If, instead, m is less thanm∗, then it is more profitable for the entrepreneur
to maintain her for-profit legal status but is punished for having skimped on quality; therefore, his
utility is reduced to the one-shot level of profit: U sf (m) = z −m(q̂ − q
s
f )− c(q
s
f ) − b(q̂ − q
s
f ) every
period after the deviation.
3.2 Nonprofit Status
If the entrepreneur is nonprofit, then his problem is to choose qn to maximize one-period utility
Un(qn):
(9) max
qn
Un(qn) = δ (z −m(q̂ − qn)− c(qn))− b(q̂ − qn).
The utility maximizing choice of quality q∗n(m) satisfies
(10) δc′(q∗n(m)) = b+ δm⇒ q
∗
n(m) = c
′ −1
(
b+ δm
δ
)
with dq
∗
n(m)
dm =
1
c′′(q∗n)
> 0, and q∗n(m) > q
s
n. Utility is given by
(11) Un(q
∗
n(m)) = δ (z −m(q̂ − q
∗
n(m)) − c(q
∗
n(m)))− b(q̂ − q
∗
n(m)).
Notice that (6) and (10) imply that q∗n(m) > q
∗
f (m); first-best quality under nonprofit status is
greater than under for-profit status.
Lemma 1 There exists m ∈ (0,m∗), such that Un(q
∗
n(m)) is T U sf (m) for m T m.
Proof. First we establish that U sf (0) > Un(q
∗
n(0)). To see this, note that Un(q
∗
n(0)) = δ (z − c(q
∗
n(0)))−
b(q̂ − q∗n(0)), while U
s
f (0) = z − c(q
s
f )− b(q̂ − q
s
f ), so U
s
f (0) > Un(q
∗
n(0)) iff z − c(q
s
f ) − b(q̂ − q
s
f ) >
δ (z − c(q∗n(0))) − b(q̂ − q
∗
n(0)) ⇐⇒ bq
s
f − c(q
s
f ) + (1 − δ)z > bq
∗
n(0) − c(q
∗
n(0)). The last in-
equality is true because bqsf − c(q
s
f ) > bq
∗
n(0) − c(q
∗
n(0)) since
{
qsf = argmax
q
[bq − c(q)]
}
. Also,
10
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Un(q
∗
n(m
∗)) > U sf (m
∗). To see this, recall that U sf (m
∗) = U sn(m
∗) and that Un(q
∗
n(m)) > U
s
n(m) ∀
m ∈ [0,m]. Note that
dUn(q
∗
n(m
∗))
dm
= −δ(q̂ − q∗n(m)),
which implies that
dUn(q
∗
n(m
∗))
dm
T 0⇔ q∗n(m) T q̂
and that
d2Un(q
∗
n(m
∗))
dm2
= δ
dq∗n(m)
dm
> 0;
that is, Un(q
∗
n(m)) is continuous and U-shaped (it is decreasing, for m such that q
∗
n(m) < q̂, and
increasing for m such that q∗n(m) > q̂) and U
s
f (m) is continuous, strictly decreasing and linear
for m ∈ [0,m]. There exists a unique m ∈ (0,m∗) such that Un(q
∗
n(m)) = U
s
f (m), and therefore
Un(q
∗
n(m)) is T U sf (m) for m T m.
Lemma 1 suggests that for low m, m ∈ (0,m), nonprofit status is not desirable even if a
reputation for quality can be established. The intuition is that when m is small, the price premium
that the consumer is willing to pay a nonprofit firm for higher quality is not enough to compensate
the entrepreneur for the loss of income due to the limited access to profits.
As in the case of a for-profit entrepreneur, the first-best choice of quality (q∗n(m)) will be
supported in equilibrium if and only if the discounted stream of utility from adhering to honest
behavior exceeds the payoff stream from the deviating path. That is, incentive compatibility for a
nonprofit entrepreneur is
(12)
 11−βUn(q∗n(m∗)) ≥ U cn(m) +
β
1−β U
s
f (m) if m < m < m
∗
1
1−βUn(q
∗
n(m
∗)) ≥ U cn(m) +
β
1−β U
s
n(m) if m
∗ ≤ m ≤ m
(ICN )
where U cn(m) = δ (z −m(q̂ − q
∗
n(m))− c(q
s
n))−b(q̂−q
s
n) is the utility the entrepreneur can attain if
he deviates from offering the anticipated first-best level of quality and instead produces the one-shot
utility maximizing choice of quality qsn (i.e. q
s
n satisfies δc
′(qsn) = b). The arguments regarding the
choice of legal status and the corresponding payoff after the deviation are analogous to the ones we
made above for the for-profit case. The difference here is that, as Lemma 1 suggests, for m < m
−
, it
is U sf (m) > Un(q
∗
n(m
∗)), so (ICN ) cannot be satisfied, which implies that a nonprofit entrepreneur
cannot commit to providing first-best quality (q∗n(m)) to the low m segment of the market.
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4 Optimal Choice of Organizational Form
4.1 Overview
In the multi-period formulation, the entrepreneur has two distinct decisions to make: what organi-
zational type to choose and whether to establish reputation for quality or not. Consequently, four
possible combinations of firm-status (for-profit, nonprofit) and quality (first-best, one-shot) may
arise. The optimal choice of firm status and quality can be analyzed with reference to the two crit-
ical exogenous parameters: the firm’s discount factor β and consumer’s sensitivity to unverifiable
quality m. To this end, it is useful to rearrange (ICF ) and (ICN ) as follows:
(13)
 β ≥
Uc
f
(m)−Uf (q
∗
f
(m))
Uc
f
(m)−Us
f
(m) if 0 < m ≤ m
∗
β ≥
Uc
f
(m)−Uf (q
∗
f
(m))
Uc
f
(m)−Usn(m)
if m∗ < m ≤ m
(14)
 β ≥
Ucn(m)−Un(q
∗
n(m))
Ucn(m)−U
s
f
(m) if m < m < m
∗
β ≥ U
c
n(m)−Un(q
∗
n(m))
Ucn(m)−U
s
n(m)
if m∗ ≤ m ≤ m
.
The right-hand-side of (13) and (14) define critical values for the discount factor β, which we
shall denote βf (m) and βn(m), respectively, above which delivery of first-best quality can be
sustained. That is, for m such that β > βf (m), (ICF ) is satisfied and the for-profit entrepreneur
delivers first-best quality q∗f (m). Likewise, for m such that β > βn(m), (ICN ) is satisfied and the
nonprofit entrepreneur chooses the first-best level quality q∗n(m). Our aim is to establish, first,
which organizational form is preferable when reputations can be established, and second, which
organizational form can support first best quality for the widest range of discount factors; namely,
we shall be interested in comparing βf (m) to βn(m).
To compare utility across organizational forms, note that the relative benefit of being for-profit
when (ICF ) and (ICN ) are slack is given by
(15) G(m) =
[
(m+ b)q∗f (m)− c(q
∗
f (m))
]
−
[
(δm+ b)q∗n(m)− δc(q
∗
f (m))
]
+ (1− δ)(z −mq̂).
The following lemma applies:
Lemma 2 When the entrepreneur can commit to the first-best level of quality q∗f (m) and q
∗
n(m),
12
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then for-profit status is more attractive at any level of m, that is, G(m) > 0 ∀ m ∈ (0,m).14
Proof. We want to show that Uf (q
∗
f (m)) > Un(q
∗
n(m)) , or equivalently that
(16) z−m(q̂−q∗f(m))−c(q
∗
f (m))−b(q̂−q
∗
f (m)) > δ (z −m(q̂ − q
∗
n(m))− c(q
∗
n(m)))−b(q̂−q
∗
n(m)).
To show that (16) holds note that
z −m(q̂ − q∗f (m))− c(q
∗
f (m))− b(q̂ − q
∗
f (m)) > z −m(q̂ − q
∗
n(m))− c(q
∗
n(m))− b(q̂ − q
∗
n(m)),
since
q∗f (m) = argmax
q
[(b+m)q − c(q)],
which implies that
z−m(q̂−q∗f (m))−c(q
∗
f (m))−b(q̂−q
∗
f(m)) > δ (z −m(q̂ − q
∗
n(m))− c(q
∗
n(m)))−b(q̂−q
∗
n(m) for δ ∈ (0, 1)
which establishes (16).
This result suggests that reputation forces favour for-profit status. The intuition for this is
that as m increases, the for-profit firm can now anticipate the price reduction that will occur if it
does not offer better quality and adjusts the optimal quality offered q∗f (m) upwards, thus remaining
more attractive than the nonprofit firm for any m. This is the power of the reputation mechanism;
it allows for-profit firms to commit credibly to delivering the high quality service because it is more
valuable to them to do so.
Next, in order to compare βf (m) to βn(m), notice that, after substitution and the appropriate
simplifications, (13) and (14) imply that
(17) βf (m) =

(bqsf−c(q
s
f
))−(bq∗f (m)−c(q
∗
f
(m)))
m(q∗
f
(m)−qs
f
) if 0 < m ≤ m
∗
(bqsf−c(q
s
f
))−(bq∗f (m)−c(q
∗
f
(m)))
(1−δ)(z−mbq)+mq∗
f
(m)−c(qs
f
)+bqs
f
−δmqsn+δc(q
s
n)−bq
s
n
if m∗ < m ≤ m
and
(18) βn(m) =

(bqsn−δc(q
s
n))−(bq
∗
n(m)−δc(q
∗
n(m)))
−(1−δ)(z−mbq)+δmq∗n(m)−δc(qsn)+bqsn−mqsf+c(qsf )−bqsf if m < m < m
∗
(bqsn−δc(q
s
n))−(bq
∗
n(m)−δc(q
∗
n(m)))
δm(q∗n(m)−q
s
n)
if m∗ ≤ m ≤ m
.
14It follows, a fortiori, that for profit status is more attractive when the entrepreneur can choose first-best quality
q∗f (m) when for-profit, but (ICN) is not satisfied. That is, Uf (q
∗
f (m)) > Un(q
∗
n(m)) implies that Uf (q
∗
f (m)) > U
s
n(m)
∀ m ∈ (0,
−
m).
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Analyzing the monotonicity and the relative position of βf (m) and βn(m) generally, as inspec-
tion of (17) and (18) suggests, is intractable. To gain some intuition for this, notice that βf (m)
and βn(m) can be rewritten as follows:
(19) βi(m) =
Bi(m)
Bi(m) + Li(m)
for each i ∈ {f, n}
where Bi(m) = U
c
i (m) − Ui(q
∗
i (m)) denotes the one-time benefit from cheating, and Li(m) =
Ui(q
∗
i (m))−U
s
i (m) denotes the absolute value of the future loss induced by the punishment. From
(19), it follows that
(20) βf (m) T βn(m)⇔
Bf (m)
Lf (m)
T Bn(m)
Ln(m)
.
This last condition suggests that comparing βf (m) to βn(m) amounts to comparing the ratio of
benefits and losses associated with a deviation across organizational forms and for different values
of m. Intuitively, one might think that under nonprofit status the manager’s incentive to cheat
is attenuated because he can only partially enjoy the extra profits generated due to cheating, so
we might expect Bn(m) to be smaller than Bf (m). On the other hand, though, the value of the
punishment inflicted in the event of cheating is also smaller (the expression in the denominator),
so it is not immediately clear how βf (m) compares to βn(m).
In particular, closer inspection of (17) and (18) suggests that the value and the monotonicity
of these expressions depend on relative changes of terms involving c(.), which renders the problem
intractable. Therefore, in order to proceed to a full characterization of the properties of βf (m) and
βn(m) and therefore of the optimal choice of firm, we need to place some structure on the cost
function c(q).
Assumption 1 c(q) = 12q
2.15
The following lemma describes the properties of βf (m) and βn(m).
Lemma 3 (i) βf (m) =
1
2 for m ∈ (0,m
∗], and βn(m) =
1
2 for m ∈ [m
∗,m).
(ii) βn(m) > βf (m) for m ∈ (0,m
∗), and βf (m) > βn(m) for m ∈ (m
∗,m).
(iii) βn(m) is decreasing, for m ∈ (0,m
∗).
15Note that this specification satisfies the regularity conditions imposed on c(.). This particular formulation is
convenient for deriving insights from the analytic results that follow.
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(iv) βf (m) reaches a maximum at m = 2m
∗.
Proof. First note that when c(q) = 12q
2, the marginal cost is c′(q) = q, which implies that qsf = b
and qsn =
1
δ b, while c(q
s
f ) =
1
2b
2 and c(qsn) =
1
2(
1
δ b)
2. Also, substitution into (6) and (10) implies
that q∗f (m) = b+m and q
∗
n(m) =
1
δ (b+δm), so c(q
∗
f (m)) =
1
2(b+m)
2 and c(q∗n(m)) =
1
2 (
1
δ (b+δm))
2.
We show part (i) by inserting the values for qsf , q
s
n, c(q
s
f ), c(q
s
n), q
∗
f (m), q
∗
n(m), c(q
∗
f (m)), and
c(q∗n(m)) into (17) and (18), and simplifying to obtain
(21) βf (m) =

1
2 if 0 < m ≤ m
∗
m2/2
(1−δ)
“
z− b
2
2δ
−bqm”+m2 if m
∗ < m ≤ m,
and
(22) βn(m) =

δm2/2
−(1−δ)
“
z− b
2
2δ
−bqm”+δm2 if m < m < m
∗
1
2 if m
∗ ≤ m ≤ m
,
which establishes part (i) of the lemma.
For part (ii), it is useful to compute m∗first. From (4), we have
m∗ =
(1− δ)z − (c(qsf )− δc(q
s
n))− b(q
s
n − q
s
f )
(1− δ)q̂ − qsf + δq
s
n
=
(1− δ)z −
(
1
2b
2 − δ 12(
1
δ b)
2
)
− b(1δ b− b)
(1− δ)q̂ − b+ δ 1δ b
=
z − b
2
2δ
q̂
.
We need to show that first, for m ∈ (0,m∗), βn(m) > βf (m), or equivalently that
(23)
δm2/2
−(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+ δm2
>
1
2
⇔ m <
z − b
2
2δ
q̂
= m∗,
so the inequality holds. Second, we want to show that for m ∈ (m∗,m), βf (m) > βn(m), or
equivalently that
(24)
1
2
<
m2/2
(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+m2
⇔ m >
z − b
2
2δ
q̂
= m∗,
so the second inequality is also established.
For part (iii), differentiating βn(m) with respect to m yields
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∂βn(m)
∂m
=
δm
[
−(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+ δm2
]
− 12δm
2 (2δm+ q̂(1− δ))[
−(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+ δm2
]2 ,
implying that
∂βn(m)
∂m
S 0⇔ δm
[
−(1− δ)
(
z −
b2
2δ
− q̂m
)
+ δm2
]
−
1
2
δm2 (2δm+ q̂(1 − δ)) S 0
⇔ m S 2
z − b
2
2δ
q̂
= 2m∗,
so for m ∈ (0,m∗), ∂βn(m)∂m < 0, that is, βn(m) is decreasing.
For part (iv), differentiating βf (m) with respect to m,
∂βf (m)
∂m
=
m
[
(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+m2
]
− 12m
2 (2m− q̂(1− δ))[
(1− δ)
(
z − b
2
2δ − q̂m
)
+m2
]2 ,
implying that
∂βf (m)
∂m
S 0⇔ m
[
(1− δ)
(
z −
b2
2δ
− q̂m
)
+m2
]
−
1
2
m2 (2δm+ q̂(1− δ)) S 0
⇔ m S 2
(
z − b
2
2δ
q̂
)
= 2m∗,
so βf (m) is flat in (0,m
∗) , increasing in (m∗, 2m∗) , and decreasing in (2m∗,m) , which implies that
it reaches a maximum at 2m∗.
The analysis is significantly aided by reference to Figure 1, which Lemma 3 helps us construct
and which illustrates βf (m) and βn(m) in (m,β) space.
16 Note that form such that the punishment
path after cheating does not include conversion of legal status, βf (m) and βn(m) remain flat and
equal. This, however, is not true in the subintervals of (m,m) where the punishment phase entails
change of the firm’s legal status prescribed by entrepreneur’s optimal behavior in the one-shot game.
In this case, two opposite effects govern the monotonicity of βf (m) and βn(m). On one hand, the
first period benefit of cheating increases withm, which implies that incentive compatibility becomes
stricter. On the other hand, the benefit of committing to high quality, relative to being a one-shot
firm, increases with m for periods two onwards as the reputation firm adjusts optimal quality
upwards while the one-shot firm adheres to the stage game quality. For m ∈ (0,m∗], the second
16The figure is constructed assuming the following parameter values: δ = 0.5, Z = 50, b = 1, bq = 3.
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effect dominates the first effect we described above, so the overall tendency is for (ICN ) to become
increasingly easier to satisfy; hence βn(m) is decreasing. For m ∈ (m
∗,m), βf (m) is non-monotonic
because initially the first effect dominates while for higher m the second effect takes over.
[Figure 1]
We can now determine the entrepreneur’s choice of firm status for β lying in three different
subintervals of (0, 1) by referring to figure 1.
4.2 Optimal choice when β ∈ [βf (2m
∗), 1)
The following proposition applies:
Proposition 1 If the entrepreneur is sufficiently patient (i.e. β ≥ βf (2m
∗)), then the (ICF ) never
binds and for-profit status is the preferred choice of organization, for any level of m. Furthermore,
the first-best level of quality (q∗f (m)) can be sustained.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 and the fact that βf (2m
∗) is the maximum value that
βf (m) takes in (0,m). Therefore, for β ≥ βf (2m
∗), (ICF ) is always satisfied, so it follows from
Lemma 2 that for-profit status is the optimal choice of legal status and that first best quality
(q∗f (m)) is provided.
4.3 Optimal choice when β ∈ (1
2
, βf(2m
∗))
To analyze the optimal choice of organizational form when β lies in the interval (12 , βf (2m
∗)), it is
useful to divide the relevant (β,m) space into the following two mutually exclusive and exhaustive
regions, also illustrated in Figure 2:
Definition 1 a) Region A consists of β ∈ [βf (m), βf (2m
∗)) and m ∈ (0,m) such that β > βf (m).
b) Region B consists of β ∈ (12 , βf (m)) and m ∈ (m
∗,m) such that βn(m) < βf (m).
The following proposition summarizes the optimal choice of organizational form and quality for
β ∈ (12 , βf (2m
∗)):
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Proposition 2 a) In Region A the entrepreneur chooses for-profit status and delivers first-best
quality q∗f (m).
b) In Region B the entrepreneur chooses nonprofit status and delivers first-best quality q∗n(m).
Proof. a) Note that in region A it is β > βf (m), so (ICF ) is satisfied; thus it follows from
Lemma 2 that for-profit status is the optimal choice of legal status and that first best quality
(q∗f (m)) is provided.
b) In region B it is βn(m) < β < βf (m), implying that only (ICN ) is satisfied, which means
that nonprofit status offering first best quality (q∗n(m)) will be chosen.
Moreover, whether (ICF ) is satisfied or not, for m ∈ (m
∗,m) depends on parameters such as
the consumer’s willingness to pay for the service (z) and the entrepreneur’s altruistic taste b.
Remark 1 Differentiation of βf (m) for m ∈ (m
∗,m) yields
a)
∂βf (m)
∂z < 0,
b)
∂βf (m)
∂b > 0.
Thus, the higher the profitability of the industry or the firm, the larger area A becomes, which
implies that the greater is the likelihood that (ICF ) will be satisfied and entrepreneurs are going
to choose for-profit status as the preferred form of organization. On the other hand, the more an
entrepreneur is intrinsically concerned about quality, the larger area B becomes, which means that
it is harder to maintain first-best quality under for-profit status.
4.4 Optimal choice when β ∈ (0, 1
2
)
The following proposition applies:
Proposition 3 If β < 12 , then (ICF ) and (ICN ) are never satisfied for any level of m and repu-
tations cannot be sustained regardless of what legal status the entrepreneur chooses. The optimal
choice of organizational type is the one described in the one-shot game.
Proof. It is immediately clear from Lemma 3 and figure 1 that for β < 12 , β < βf (m) and
β < βn(m), so both (ICF ) and (ICN ) fail.
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For reference, the various possible outcomes of the repeated game are also illustrated in Figure
2 and summarized in Table 1.
[Figure 2]
Table 1
Summary of Optimal Choice of Firm Status and Quality by Region
Region Firm Status Quality
(0,m)× [βf (2m
∗), 1) FP q∗f
A : (0,m)× (βf (m), βf (2m
∗)) FP q∗f
B : (m∗,m)× (12 , βf (m)) NFP q
∗
n
(0,m)× (0, 12) One− Shot Analysis
The foregoing analysis suggests that if we imagine that there is a distribution of β′s in the
population of entrepreneurs, then those who have sufficiently high β will choose for-profit status
and will deliver high quality service. There is an intermediate range of β′s where the choice of
firm status varies with m. Finally, for very low β, reputations are not going to be established and
the one-shot analysis of Glaeser and Shleifer will apply.17 The value of β need not be interpreted
literally as a discount factor. There are plenty of reasons that one would expect variation in
managerial outlook of future profitability that are not directly related to one’s personal rate of
time preference. For example, some markets may have higher demand growth than others, which
means that the potential future losses from shirking on quality and losing reputation in these
markets are higher. These kinds of differences in market-specific or sector-specific conditions can
be regarded as determinants of the effective discount factors that have to be applied by potential
entrants when deciding which firm status to choose and what level of quality to offer.
It is noteworthy that if we were to adopt the view that the optimal organizational form is
the one that minimizes the discount factor that is necessary to sustain first-best quality, then
the outcome of the repeated game matches with that of the static game. That is, there exists a
threshold value for consumer preference for quality m∗, above which nonprofit status is optimal
and below which for-profit status dominates. This way of ranking organizations may be relevant
if, for instance, we believe that free-entry competition among firms will ensure that the incentive
compatible constraints (ICF ) and (ICN ) bind. Then, we should expect the organizational form
with the lower critical value for the discount factor to drive the other one out of the market.
17There may also be ideological or religious motivations that make nonprofit status attractive for some people and
therefore affect the supply of nonprofit activity. Much like most of the literature that relies on contractual failures,
we have abstracted from these considerations here.
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The analysis of the optimal choice of firm status was considerably simplified by introducing an
explicit functional form for the cost function since a general characterization is not possible. The
particular formulation we used is convenient for deriving simple analytical results, but numerical
examples using higher-order power functions and the exponential function suggest that the insights
obtained are robust to alternative specifications of the cost function. Table 2 reports the three
critical cut-off values of m obtained from these examples, supposing that δ = 0.5, Z = 50, b =
1, q̂ = 3. Note that m˜ denotes the threshold level of m below which βf (m) < βn(m) and above
which βf (m) > βn(m). One can see in Table 2 that the basic properties of βf (m) and βn(m) and
therefore the pattern of the optimal choice of organizational form that emerge from Table 1 are
present in all of the alternative specifications of the cost function we consider.
Table 2: Numerical Examples
Cost function m∗ m˜ m
c(q) = 12q
2 16.33 16.33 46.00
c(q) = 13q
3 20.48 23.72 28.93
c(q) = 14q
4 21.95 24.66 26.37
c(q) = 15q
5 22.70 24.89 25.35
c(q) = (eq − 1) 13.43 16.51 19.24
Rest of parameter values: δ = 0.5, Z = 50, b = 1, q̂ = 3.
5 Relating the Model to some Empirical Evidence
We believe that the predictions obtained from the dynamic framework can help us to understand
some facts concerning quality differentials in mixed sectors which the one-shot model falls short of
explaining. For instance, consider the market for child care, which features a considerable nonprofit
presence, making it appropriate for drawing comparisons between the quality offered by for-profit
and nonprofit providers.18 Furthermore, the quality dimension in child care is arguably hard to
measure and verify, which makes it amenable to the incomplete contracts framework we have laid out
above. Our reading of the empirical evidence on the between-sector differences in quality from the
U.S. and Canada19 is that although most studies find that nonprofit centres as a group obtain higher
18Studies that examine the relative performance of nonprofits are too many to list here; see Rose-Ackerman (1996)
for a comprehensive review of the literature. Ortmann and Schlesinger (2003) review the empirical work on ownership-
related differences in quality from various mixed industries.
19For evidence from the U.S. child care sector, see the survey by Blau and Currie (2006) and the references therein.
For evidence from Canada, see Krashinsky (1998) and Doherty et al. (2002).
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scores on observational measures of overall quality developed by child development experts,20 this
finding cannot be interpreted as a direct confirmation of the contractual failure theory. First, the
differences on average quality between the two groups are not overwhelming, and there is variation
in quality within each category of auspice. That is, there are commercial centres that offer high
quality and nonprofit centres that offer low quality. This possibility though is in contradiction with
the strong form of the contractual failure view of the world which predicts that only nonprofits
will occupy the upper part of the quality distribution. Second, it seems very likely that the greater
access to government funding and subsidies nonprofits enjoy in certain jurisdictions could at least
partly account for the reported difference in average quality between the nonprofit and commercial
child care sectors. Finally, it is possible that the variation in quality may simply reflect choice of
market niche and be unrelated to informational asymmetries of any sort. For example, for-profit
child care centres may choose to substitute lower quality care for more convenient arrangements
offered to the parents (convenient location, longer hours, etc.).
Yet another explanation of the apparent between-sector quality differential, and indeed one
that the analysis of the repeated version of the model points to, is that because for-profit status
dominates the lower part of the quality distribution (m < m∗), even though there are some high
quality for-profit centres (in area A and for β ∈ [βf (2m
∗), 1)), on average the quality provided by
the commercial sector is lower than the nonprofit which has a higher quality threshold.21 Note
that this explanation relies on the implicit assumption that there is exogenous heterogeneity in
the discount factor in the population of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, in markets where nonprofits
have lower costs (c(q)) because of access to free space and utilities, the model suggests that more
entrepreneurs will choose nonprofit status, which would increase the average quality care in the
nonprofit sector and lower it in the commercial sector.
In light of this interpretation of the quality differential, it is interesting to revisit the ongoing
debate over the effectiveness of subsidy policies that discriminate against for-profit child care centres
on the basis that they are untrustworthy to provide high quality care. We argued above that the
existing empirical evidence on the impact of centre ownership on care quality is scant and does
not allow for sweeping conclusions, while the model considered here demonstrates that reputations
can provide enough incentives for profit-maximizing entrepreneurs to offer high quality services
when the playing field is levelled. Perhaps future empirical work may be able to settle the debate
by identifying the extent to which quality differences between sectors echo contractual failures or
20It is important that these instruments of child care quality refer to non-contractible quality and are distinct from
structural measures of quality, such as the child-teacher ratio, which are contractible.
21Recall that nonprofit status is chosen only for m > m∗.
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unequal funding opportunities.
6 Conclusion
The idea that nonprofit organizations can solve market imperfections attributable to asymmetric
information between consumers and producers regarding hard to verify quality of certain services
has been a particularly influential explanation of the emergence and expansion of the nonprofit
sector. Our task in this paper has been to perform a robustness check of this theory by allowing
reputations to serve as a competing mechanism that can ensure quality. The analysis of the model
of repeated interaction between consumers and firms yields some interesting new outcomes while it
encompasses the one-shot case originally examined by Glaeser and Shleifer. In this sense, it may be
argued that the predictions of the contractual failure hypothesis apply in the special case where the
long-run reputation mechanism cannot be sustained because interaction is not repeated or because
of frictions in the flow of information. In more general circumstances, nonprofit status does not
appear to be a necessary mechanism to overcome opportunistic behavior that arises because quality
is unverifiable. Also, the multi-period version considered in this paper provides an explanation for
the differences and variability in non-contractible quality across organizational types that have been
identified in empirical studies of the child care sector.
The goal of this paper has not been to dismiss utterly the contractual failure hypothesis, only to
challenge its scope as an explanation for the widespread presence of nonprofit organizations. The
key implication of our analysis is that in many sectors, the existence of a large number of nonprofit
firms cannot be explained with reference to their unique ability to mitigate problems of asymmetric
information. In particular, w shouldn’t expect it to be an important factor in industries where
income from sales of services constitutes the largest source of revenue and where there is repeated
interaction between consumers and providers, such as the child care sector discussed in the previous
section and other social services. This does not preclude the theory from playing an important role
in charitable services where donations are a significant source of revenues. Also, our analysis does
not rule out the expropriation problem having significant implications on the relationship between
the organization and various other economic actors such as its employees, volunteers, donors and
the different government agencies. Further research in these areas may prove fruitful in advancing
our understanding of the role, advantages and evolution of the nonprofit sector.
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